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ESSAY

CONTEXTUALIZING SHADOW CONVERSATIONS

JAMES

J. BRUDNEYt

INTRODUCTION

In Legislating in the Shadows,1 Professor Walker has deftly presented one
side of the drafting conversation that occurs between agency officials and
congressional staff. Looking through the window of technical drafting
assistance-assistancetypically provided through conversations responding
to congressional staff requests without Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) review or approval-Professor Walker sets forth and develops
wide-ranging and nuanced findings from agency participants in these
conversations. His findings describe how agency officials understand their
active and nonpublic role in the formulation of statutory text from its early
stages. He then cogently analyzes certain implications from the standpoint
of how agencies apply their interpretive authority and power.
There is much to admire in Professor Walker's approach. Empirically, he
identifies and unpacks an underappreciated aspect of contemporary federal
lawmaking. Analytically, Walker offers a rigorous assessment of doctrinal
implications from a statutory interpretation standpoint. He situates both the

t Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School. Tam grateful to Jacob
Sayward for valuable research assistance, to Ross Eisenbrey for thoughtful comments, and to Fordham
Law School for financial support.
1 Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377 (2017).
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purposivist2 possibilities and the deference-related risks in the context of

other scholarly efforts, including several quite recent contributions.3
I approach the drafting conversation described by Professor Walker from
the opposite side-that of congressional staff. In doing so, I suggest that this
conversation is complex and variable in ways that go beyond what might
typically be understood by agency officials. Building off of this complexity, I
explore certain implications of Professor Walker's analysis, by examining the
four principal reasons that agency officials offered for responding to every
congressional request for technical assistance.4 While I share Professor
Walker's view that agencies gain special purposivist insights from their
privileged participatory position in the drafting process, I am not convinced
that this privileged position is due in any meaningful way to agencies' role as
shadow legislative drafters.5 Consequently, I remain skeptical that the shadow
drafting role creates special risks of self-aggrandizing interpretive powers, or
that it materially contributes to existing concerns regarding the amount of
deference agency interpretations should receive.
I. THE VARIABILITY OF CONGRESSIONAL
DRAFTING CONVERSATIONS

Professor Walker recognizes that the technical-drafting-assistance veil he has
pierced by interviewing agency officials remains partially obscured-and in
particular, that congressional staff may disagree about the rate at which they request
or accept technical drafting assistance, as well as the factors that affect whether they

2 Purposivism refers to the recognition that statutes are more than disembodied textual
products-they are a form of communication reflecting a purposive group effort. As succinctly
expressed by Hart and Sachs, "Law is a doing of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving
to solve the basic problems of social living . . . [thus] every statute . . . has some kind of purpose or
objective, however difficult it may be on occasion to ascertain it or to agree exactly how it should be
phrased." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 148 (William N.

Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2006).
3 See Walker, supra note 1, at 1382 n.13 (discussing recent empirical work by jarrod Shobe and
by Ganesh Sitaraman, which began to explore agency provision of technical drafting assistance); id.
at 1399 (discussing a recent article by Cass Sunstein arguing that because of their institutional
expertise, agencies may be justified in construing statutes in light of their purposes, not just their
text); id. at 1408 (discussing a 2015 concurring opinion by Justice Thomas urging abolition of Auer
deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations); id. at 1415 (discussing a recent article
by Neomi Rao identifying the possibility of "administrative collusion," where members of Congress
have a unique relationship with agency heads and undue law interpretation powers).
4 These four reasons are: fostering a productive working relationship with Congress; educating
congressional staff; avoiding unnecessary disruption of an existing statutory scheme; and generating
"intelligence" to anticipate and respond to new legislative proposals. See id. at 1390-91.
5 Professor Walker distinguishes agencies' more visible foreground role in helping to draft
substantive legislation from their background or shadow role providing confidential technical
drafting assistance. See id. at 1378-79.
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seek such assistance.6 In this Part, I attempt to provide a more complete picture of
the legislative drafting enterprise, based on my first-hand congressional experience
as well as analyses of the legislative process by other scholars.
From 1985 to 1992, I served as minority counsel (1985-1986) and chief
counsel and staff director (1987-1992)

for the Senate Subcommittee on

Labor.7 This was a period of heavy legislative activity aimed at providing
workplace-related protections in the subject areas of labor and civil rights.
Factors contributing to the high level of activity include an aging workforce
that focused attention on the opportunities and obstacles faced by older
workers;8 the strength of interest group coalitions involving organized labor,
local governments, and civil rights groups;9 Congress's felt need to respond
to a number of Supreme Court decisions;o and an active response to the
bottled-up demand for social change after five years of the Reagan
Administration.

6 See id. at 1395 (noting that "the study did not endeavor to interview or survey congressional
staffers" and that the staffers "may well disagree" with the conclusions of agency officials regarding
technical drafting assistance).
7 In 1985-1986, the subcommittee was chaired by Senator Nickles (R-Okla); the ranking
minority member was Senator Metzenbaum (D-Ohio). From 1987-1992, Senator Metzenbaum
chaired the subcommittee and first Senator Quayle (R-Ind.), then Senator Jeffords (R-Vt.), served
as ranking minority member. The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee was chaired by
Senator Hatch (R-Utah) in 1985-1986 and Senator Kennedy (D-Mass.) from 1987-1992. My
primary principal during these seven years was Senator Metzenbaum; I also engaged regularly as an
agent for the leadership and decisional directions set by Senator Kennedy and his staff. In addition,
as is typical on the Hill, I worked closely with staff members serving the other chairpersons and
ranking minority members as well as staff for other Democratic members of the subcommittee and
the full committee.
8 See Clyde H. Farnsworth, The Discovery ofPolitical Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1987, at A20
(reporting on the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) as a major political player on
Capitol Hill, with one of its key issues being the right of older people to work); Penny Singer,
Enticing and Keeping the Older Worker, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1989, at WC12 (reporting that workers
aged 55 -65 outnumbered teenage workers in the U.S., but younger managers were reluctant to hire
older workers); Leonard Sloane, New Laws Allow More To Work After Age 70, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1987, at 43 (reporting on the new federal law abolishing mandatory retirement as likely to spur more
senior citizens to remain in workforce).
9 See, e.g. 131 Cong. Rec. 28,983-84 (Oct. 24, 1985) (including statements of Senator Nickles and
Senator Metzenbaum, citing support for the 1985 FLSA compensation time/overtime law from AFLCIO, US Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities, and other public employer groups); Edward
J. Cleary, Letter to the Editor, Modest and Crucial,N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1988, at A26 (describing that the
National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, and AFL-CIO all supported enactment of
a law requiring employers to give sixty days notice prior to plant closings or mass layoffs);
10 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at various
section of 42 U.S.C.) (overriding Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) and
numerous other Supreme Court decisions construing Title VII); Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §101, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at various sections of 29 U.S.C.)
(responding to Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)); Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787 (codified principally at 29 U.S.C. § 207(0))
(responding to Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).

40

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

[Vol. 166: 37

Given these and perhaps other causal factors, Congress enacted an
unusually large number of important workplace protection statutes between
the fall of 1985 and the fall of 1991. I was involved as a leading Senate
committee staffer in the drafting and negotiation for many of these laws:
amending the Fair Labor Standards Act provisions on overtime protections
for public employees;11 abolishing mandatory retirement;12 providing advance
notice to workers terminated due to plant closings or mass layoffs;13
increasing protections for older workers in the area of employee benefits;14
and extending or restoring rights against race and sex discrimination in
response to numerous restrictive Supreme Court decisions.15
During the drafting, negotiation, and enactment of these five major laws,
I had very little contact with Department of Labor or Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) officials in the Reagan and George H.W.
Bush administrations.16 The virtual absence of contact during the drafting

11 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, supra note io.
12 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, loo Stat.
3342 (codified principally at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)).
13 Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat.
890 (1988), (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109).
14 Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, supra note 10.
15 Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 10. In addition to the five major laws in which I was heavily
involved as a Senate subcommittee chief counsel, there were numerous other workplace-related statutes
enacted in which I played a more limited staffing role. E.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327; OSHA Criminal Penalty Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §3101,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-29 (1990); Employee Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §7881, 103 Stat.
2106, 2435-44 (1989); Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No.101-15 7 , 103 Stat. 938
(1989); Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989); Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988); Employee Polygraph Protection Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646. Finally, there were major proposed laws that passed the
House but were filibustered in the Senate in which I participated as the key Senate committee staffer.
E.g., Workplace Fairness Act of 1992, S. 5 5 , 103d Cong. (1992); High Risk Occupational Disease
Notification and Prevention Act of 1987, S. 7 9 , iooth Cong. (1987).
16 For the Civil Rights Act of 1991, several staff from the Senate Judiciary Committee played
a more central role than I did in the drafting and negotiations-they may have had agency
interactions of which I was unaware. The other four laws referenced in text were drafted and/or
steered through the Senate Labor Subcommittee, and I was either a, or the, principal Senate
committee staffer involved. For the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act,
the Republican Labor Department had extensive discussions with committee staff from both parties
and chambers of Congress following enactment, when considering how to approach the drafting and
implementing of regulations. Somewhat ironically, these quite constructive and fruitful discussions
reflected the Department's relative insulation from the drafting and negotiation processes that
occurred in Congress in 1987 and 1988. This was a period during which President Reagan expressed
his strong opposition to the proposed law, vetoing legislation that contained the advance notice
provisions and then allowing the WARN Act to become law without his signature when it passed
both houses a second time by veto-proof majorities. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act of 1988, supra note 13 (note from Federal Register reporting that the Act became
law without the signature of the President); see also Editorial,A Fairand PracticalPlant-ClosingsBill,
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process also was true for the two major unsuccessful bills that were approved
by the House but filibustered on the Senate floor after being reported out of
committee.17 To the best of my knowledge, these seven major bills (five
enacted) were drafted without technical assistance from agency officials-and
certainly without any such agency input across party lines.18
This hardly should be taken to suggest that committee staff draft statutory
text in isolation. In addition to frequent meetings with and directives from
my principal, Senator Metzenbaum, I interacted regularly with Senator
Kennedy's Labor and Human Resources Committee staff and with Senate
Legislative Counsel (the civil service attorneys assigned drafting
responsibilities). At various times, I consulted about drafting questions and
negotiated textual changes on behalf of my principals, with Republican staff
from the subcommittee or the full committee; with staff from other Senators'
offices; with my House committee counterparts from both parties; and with
players outside Congress including lobbyists for labor organizations, civil
rights groups, trade associations, individual companies, and local
governments. But the absence of technical input from agency officials
contrasts notably with Professor Walker's findings from agency officials who
say they make technical drafting contributions on "nearly all of the bills that
ultimately get enacted that directly affect their agency."19
Inter-branch dynamics in the legislative drafting process may have
changed in the decades since the late 198os and early 1990s. And labor and
civil rights legislation, which is often divisive along party lines, may differ
from other subject fields regarding input sought by congressional staff from
the opposite party.2 0 But an important factor in the dissonance between my

N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1988, at A2 4 (noting that Reagan had cited the same advance notice
requirements as his main reason for vetoing an earlier foreign trade bill);.
17 See Workplace Fairness Act of 1992, supra note 15; High Risk Occupational Disease
Notification and Prevention Act of 1987, supra note 15. I was the principal Senate committee staffer
for drafting and negotiation on both of these bills.
18 There may have been substantive assistance from agency officials to Republican committee
staff on one or two of these bills. In the Senate, the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985 were
a joint effort by Senators Nickles and Metzenbaum. Although I do not recall any Labor Department
drafting input for my Republican staff counterparts, it is possible that they were being advised by
agency officials as they negotiated text with me and other Democratic staff. And at early legislative
stages of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 199o, the EEOC was involved through Senate
Republican committee staff in certain substantive aspects of textual negotiations. For the five other
bills (three enacted), the drafting took place in Senate and House Democratic committee staff
offices, working with Legislative Counsel and interested outside groups, but not agency officials.
19 Walker, supra note 1, at 1390.
20 In addition, when I came to the Hill in 1985 I was a relatively experienced attorney following
two years as a judicial law clerk and four years in private practice. Staff who do not have either law
degrees or law-related experience may be more inclined to seek technical drafting assistance-from
agencies and also from interest groups. That said, during my seven years of service in the Senate,
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own experience and what agency officials reported to Professor Walker is
likely to be that the congressional drafting process is complex, messy, and far
from uniform.
In parliamentary systems, where the government controls the substance
of proposed text and the lawmaking procedures, the executive branch can be
virtually assured this text will be enacted as proposed.21 By contrast, in our
system Congress creates laws from the ground up. Bills are usually drafted by
partisan committee staff or nonpartisan legislative counsel, modified by
amendments offered in committee or on the floor, and reconciled into final
shape through conferences between the two chambers.22 As Abbe Gluck and
Lisa Bressman have reported in depth, congressional drafters recognize and
credit multiple factors in the drafting process.2 3 Gluck and Bressman
conclude there is "no mechanism for coordinating congressional drafting
behavior" or classifying it in anything close to uniform terms.2 4
One example of non-uniformity is that Senate and House legislative
counsel may play an important nonpartisan role in the drafting process, and
agencies rarely if ever meet with personnel from these offices. There are also
considerable variations in drafting approaches and dynamics between
committees. For instance, the tax standing committees (guided by the Joint
most staff colleagues working with the labor and judiciary committees, on both sides of the aisle,
had advanced degrees of some kind as well as practical experience in their fields.
21 See James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House of
Lords and the Supreme Court, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 44 (2007) ("Because the [British] government
enjoys majority support in Parliament for its legislative program and traditionally imposes tight
party discipline, there is rarely a need for it to negotiate or modify its original position."); Frank H.
Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 448 (1990)
("Parliamentary systems give the government control over the content of law, the leisure to get
things right before introducing bills, and confidence that the proposed text will be enacted as is.").
22 See Brudney, supra note 21, at 45 ("[D]ue to formal divisions in power
between the executive and legislative branches, as well as relatively lax party discipline and various
procedural obstacles within Congress, most major bills that become public laws undergo considerable
change from introduction to final enactment."); Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 448 ("Bills are drafted
by junior staffs of legislators, abused by amendments from multiple and conflicting sources, and often
hammered into shape at the very end of the session, with little time for review.").
23 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, StatutoryInterpretationfrom the Inside-An Empirical
Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: PartI, 65 STAN. L. REv. 901, 1015 (2013) ("Our
respondents emphasized many other influences on the drafting process that legal doctrine does not take
into account . . . including the central role of Legislative Counsel in drafting text, the division of
Congress into committees, the type of statute and legislative process, and the personal and professional
differences across drafters and agency personnel."); see also Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The
Politics of Legislative Drafting:A CongressionalCase Study, 77 NYU L. REV. 575, 583-93 (2002) (describing
the complexity and variability of approaches and mechanisms for legislative drafting).
24 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 23 at 1024; e.g., id. ("As we illustrate, not only the House and
Senate Offices of Legislative Counsel but also many different committees each have different
drafting practices-including different drafting manuals!"); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 23, at 583
("Our responses indicate quite strongly that there is no uniform process of legislative drafting
followed in all cases.").
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Committee on Taxation) have historically drafted on a bipartisan basis in
close consultation with the Treasury Department, with the goal of securing
unanimity prior to introduction.25 By contrast, the labor standing committees
often draft along partisan lines, with far greater likelihood of polarization and
opposition in committee, followed by amendments on the floor.26 Further,
although committees are primarily responsible for crafting legislation under
the traditional model, laws may emerge through unorthodox channels,
especially in today's hyper-partisan and gridlocked environment. A notable
example is omnibus bills written by the majority leader and various
committee chairs, and bundled together just before floor consideration.27 And
there are separate drafting cultures in the House-where the party with a
comfortable majority can often control the content of legislative language-and
the Senate-where bill drafters understand they will generally need the assent
of sixty members to do serious legislative business.
These divergent drafting models are layered onto the impact of divided
government, an impact that resonated during my years of Senate committee
service. Although divided government has been present far more often than
not since 1980,28 Professor Walker's survey respondents state that "the
identity and politics of the congressional requester do not seem to matter too
much" with regard to accepting the agency's technical feedback.29 That
conclusion conflicts with my observations described above, which date from
a less toxically partisan period than has existed between the branches in recent
times. Further, Gluck and Bressman report that seventy-six percent of
congressional drafters indicated that divided government is relevant to
whether drafters intend for the agency to have gap-filling authority.30 In
short, it stands to reason that Democratic committee staff, while drafting
legislation, will not reach out as often, or on as weighty matters, in search of
technical drafting assistance from agencies in a Republican executive branch,
25 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation:Comparing
Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1246-47, 1280-83 (2009).
26 See id. at 1262, 1282.

27 See also Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1789, 18oo (2015) (noting that the omnibus appropriations process is now being used in ways
other than its intended purpose). See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING:
NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (4 th ed. 2012) (providing a broader
account of existing legislative processes implemented in unconventional ways to pass legislation.)
28 The Presidency and both Houses of Congress have been controlled by the same party for
eight of the 36 years from 1981-2016: 1993-1994, 2003-2006, and 2009-2010. The Senate majority
was filibuster-proof in only two of those eight years: 2009-10. Chris Canipe, Presidency, House and

Senate: What Happens When

One Party Takes Control, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2017)
http://www.wsj.com/graphics/congress-control/ [https://perma.cc/C656-RG831.
29 Walker, supra note 1, at 1395.
30 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 23, at 1000 (reporting that forty percent indicated divided
government was always or often relevant, and thirty-six percent that it was sometimes relevant).
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and vice versa. Agency officials surveyed by Professor Walker report that they
will respond as requested regardless of divided government. Still, it would be
important to know not only how often agencies are asked for input in divided
government circumstances, but also how often the agencies' input is actually
accepted by congressional staff from the opposite party, as well as if the nature
of the technical requests differs during periods of divided government.
Gluck and Bressman report, based on their survey of congressional
drafters, that agencies "often . .. participate in drafting and can be very useful
partners," although the authors also point out that drafters "sometimes
avoided the agency, particularly when they were aware of a conflicting
position."31 My own anecdotal experience during seven years of divided
government indicates that drafters do not usually request drafting assistance
of a substantive or even technical nature from agency officials across party
lines. From the congressional staff perspective it therefore remains at least
questionable whether legislating in the shadows "heavily influence[s] the
scope and character of [agencies'] legislative mandates,"32 or in what ways
agencies are "deeply involved in the legislative process from a technical
assistance perspective for statutes that directly affect them."33

Stepping back, it seems plausible that players in each branch, immersed
in their own contributory roles, may be inclined to oversell their respective
control of or influence over the legislative drafting process. Yet it is the
congressional players-vested with responsibility for initiating and
consummating the legislative product-who have primary knowledge of what
transpires as part of the drafting process. More information from the
congressional perspective might help to modulate the potential for selfpromoting responses from agency personnel. For instance, when Professor
Walker refers to agency perceptions on factors that affect "whether the
congressional requester accepted the agency's technical feedback on proposed
legislation,"34 one concession to modulation would recognize that "accepted"
may be a wooly concept. If agency technical feedback addresses several points,
both major and minor, what qualifies as acceptance? And would the
congressional requester calibrate acceptance in roughly the same way as the
agency provider? Walker is not insensitive to this problem: at one point, he
acknowledges that it is virtually impossible for a court to ascertain which parts
of the statute the agency drafted, or even agreed with.35 Nonetheless, a proper
assessment of the influence wielded through technical drafting assistance

31 Id. at looo.

32 Walker, supra note 1, at 1397.
33 Id. at 1403.
34 Id. at 1395.
35 See id. at 1404-05 (explaining this difficulty in terms of the "shadow" nature of the drafting).
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requires a deeper and more contextualized appreciation for how congressional
staff receiving this feedback perceive its value and integrate its substance.36
II. AGENCY MOTIVES FOR RESPONDING TO CONGRESSIONAL
STAFF REQUESTS

Also relevant to the context of these technical drafting conversations is
Professor Walker's identification of four distinct reasons-or justifications-that
agency officials offered for responding to every congressional request. I found
these four justifications to be quite persuasive as a group. It is worth noting how
two of the reasons are essentially exogenous to refining or enhancing the
merits of particular drafts while the other two more directly implicate the
status of draft legislation.
Specifically, "maintain[ing] a healthy and productive working relationship
with Congress,"37 and helping to "educate the congressional staffers about the
agency's existing statutory and regulatory framework"38 sound as process,
rather than merits, type justifications. By furnishing professionally respectful
responses and providing educational overviews, agency officials maintain and
lubricate their relations with congressional staff unrelated to the merits or
risks that inhere in particular draft bills.
Agencies have ongoing and often complicated relationships with the staff
from congressional standing committees. Beyond legislative drafting, agency
officials frequently interact with committee staff prior to and during
confirmation hearings for high-ranking agency personnel, and also with
respect to the committee's oversight functions.39 The agency players for these
distinct functions (technical drafting, political nominations, substantive
oversight) may well differ, but the same committee staff are likely to be
responsible in all three areas. 40 It is therefore valuable, and at times even
essential, that agency drafting experts respond positively to requests from

36 Walker's empirical discussion includes a brief subsection titled "The Congressional Reply"
(.B. 3 ) but this essentially provides inferences from agency personnel rather than perceptions from
the congressional staff players. Id. at 1395-96
37 Id. at 1391
38

Id.

39 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT, JAMES J.
BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 996-1009, 1019-1023
(Fifth ed. 2014) (describing congressional monitoring of agencies through oversight hearings and
investigations, and through the confirmation process).
40 With respect to the Senate Labor Subcommittee during the 198os and 1990s, our limited
number of majority and minority staff handled all three of these areas. Based on my experience and
perceptions, the same committee staff in labor, civil rights, education, and other substantive areas
are responsible for working with usually-different groups of agency officials regarding drafting of
text, preparing to question executive branch nominees, and carrying out many oversight activities.
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committee personnel who can directly affect their agency colleagues'
responsibilities in other aspects of the inter-branch dialogue.41
Agency officials offered two additional justifications for responding to
every request; these relate more directly to the substance of draft legislation.
When agencies "help[] ensure that the proposed legislation does not
unnecessarily disrupt the existing statutory (and regulatory) scheme,"42 their
technical assistance targets the merits of the draft law under review.43 And
when technical drafting assistance serves as "a very good source of
intelligence," that assistance enhances the agency's ability "to anticipate,
monitor, and respond to potential [future drafts] that could affect the agency
and its regulatory activities."44 Here the agency is focused on possible risks
flowing from subsequent draft proposals.
These merits-related justifications, especially avoiding unnecessary
disruption of existing laws and regulations, suggest that agency officials may
have strategic as well as relational motives when responding to congressional
requests. It is hardly surprising that agency officials would act on the felt need
to preserve from disruption their existing substantive powers and
responsibilities even as they are asked only for technicalinput. One might also
expect that such merits-related reasons figure more prominently for bills
introduced and promoted by committee leaders, which have a reasonable
likelihood of becoming laws, than for bills offered by backbenchers or
minority members where there is far less chance of enactment (but the agency
retains its desire to maintain healthy relations and also to educate members
who may occupy positions of leadership in the future).
The distinctive nature of agency officials' motivations may be relevant
when assessing whether to adjust the calculus for OMB clearance. As
Professor Walker explains, an executive agency must go through an OMB
coordination and preclearance process when it proposes to engage in
legislative activity.45 If the justification of avoiding unnecessary disruption of
existing laws and regulations is playing an especially central role in technical
drafting assistance where laws are later enacted, perhaps OMB should
consider reviewing this type of assistance as substantive. In response, agency
41 I assume for present purposes that agencies communicate reasonably efficiently on an internal
basis regarding their distinct functions. Professor Walker contends, based on his own findings and those
of other scholars, that this is the case regarding communications among agency officials who are
legislative lawyers, regulatory lawyers, and policy experts. See supra note 1, at 1402-03.
42 Id. at 1391.
43 This merits-related advising arguably implicates a substantive interpretive role described by
one legal scholar as "discern[ing] and apply[ing] the background principles of the field of law involved."
Jonathan R. Siegel, Guardiansof the Background Principles,2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 123, 130 (2009).
44 Walker, supra note 1, at 1391.
45 See id. at 1385 (noting that legislative activity "involves the agency expressing a policy or
substantive view on legislation.").
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officials-or Professor Walker-may wish to explain how such merits-related
technical drafting assistance differs from what is described as substantive
legislative activity, apart from the fact that Congress is the initiating requester
in the technical assistance setting.
To be clear, I do not support an expanded role for OMB preclearance.
Professor Walker considers arguments in favor of greater transparency in the
shadow lawmaking context, including requiring OMB preclearance.
However, he is against extending such presidential review over technical
drafting assistance for reasons he explains in persuasive terms. 46 I agree that
enforced exposure to White House bureaucratic review might well chill
congressional staff from consulting with agency drafting experts. The chilling
effect seems especially likely in today's polarized partisan environment,
intensified by constant political media exposure flowing from the 24-hour
cable news cycle. Democratic committee staff will be wary of reactions from
their base for consulting with Republican agency officials, and Republican
executive agency drafting experts may fear being hammered by Republican
members of Congress if they are known to be interacting with Democratic
committee staff on possible draft legislation.47 At the same time, part of what
justifies Walker's argument against extending preclearance review is the
premise that this technical assistance is purely technical. Insofar as one
important reason for responding to congressional staff requests strikes a more
strategic and substantive chord, further justification may be needed.
III. TECHNICAL DRAFTING ASSISTANCE AND THE
CREATION OF AMBIGUOUS
TEXT

An important additional question addressed by Professor Walker is
whether agencies' shadow role in the drafting process should have
implications for their position as interpreters of the statutory product to
which they contribute. In order to answer this question, one must first
consider agencies' special interpretive position in the legislative process.
It is well understood that at a substantive level, agencies occupy a
privileged place in the lawmaking enterprise. Executive branch agencies
regularly interact with congressional staff at multiple stages under authorized
(OMB-approved) circumstances: they work with staff to draft initial
statutory language (as in the tax committee circumstances described above);48
46 See id. at 429-30 (noting the problems with OMB review, including "the lack of transparency
in the OMB review process and the lack of accountability for OMB decisionmaking" as well as the
chilling effect on congressional requests that I discuss in text).
47 See generally id. at 1427-28.
48 See supra text accompanying note 25.
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present their own draft bills for introduction by committee staff; testify on
proposed legislation at committee hearings; provide official views as part of
committee markups; send letters to committee chairs or congressional leaders
indicating changes the President would like to see made as bills approach a
floor vote; and advise the President about signing or vetoing approved bills.49
Because of this insider status, legal scholars have long recognized that
agencies have a comparative institutional advantage (over judges and outside
interest groups) in discerning the meaning of ambiguous or inconclusive text,
based on their understanding of the specific legislative intent or general
legislative purpose underlying such text.50 Professor Walker's earlier
empirical work,si as well as the contributions from other legal scholars,52
support the conclusion that agencies are especially well situated to engage in
purposivist analyses of statutory texts that identify their powers,
responsibilities, and limitations.
At the same time, scholars have recognized that agencies' privileged access
to the lawmaking process may justify a degree of caution when considering
how those same agencies construe and apply the text they had a hand in
helping create. As Walker notes, an agency may invoke its insider
understanding of congressional purpose to steer imprecise or ambiguous
49 See Walker, supra note 1, at 1378 (discussing agencies presenting their own draft bills); see
also Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and InterpretiveRevolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary,
and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 337 (2013) (discussing agencies
testifying on proposed legislation); Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of the
Role ofAgencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451,494 (2017) (discussing agencies
public and informal ways of expressing opposition to pending legislation); Christopher J. Walker,
Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process: Technical Assistance in Statutory Drafting, ADMIN. CONF.
U.S. 8 (2015) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826146 [https://perma.cc/V3B6-88J 4 ] (discussing agencies
advising President about signing or vetoing approved bills as well as agencies providing official views
as part of committee markup).
50 See, e.g. Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 97-98; Siegel, supra note 43, at 13o; Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the
Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 884 (2015); Peter L.
Strauss, When the Judge is Not the PrimaryOfficial with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretationand
the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 329, 347 (1990). For a succinct
explanation of the difference between intent (the specific understanding the legislature had in mind
during the enactment process) and purpose (what the legislature ultimately sought to accomplish
following enactment), see Herz, supra, at 93. Like Professor Walker, I assume in this context that
legislative history may in suitable circumstances provide reliable evidence of legislative intent, and
that legislative purpose is a coherent and meaningful concept, thereby avoiding debates with ardent
textualists like Justice Scalia and dedicated public choice advocates like Judge Easterbrook.
51 See ChristopherJ. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation,67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1036-47
(2015) (discussing agency roles in legislating; the purpose and reliability of legislative intent; the
reliability of legislative history; and the factors affecting this reliability).
52 See supra note 5o; Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 511 (2005)
("[Agencies] might, as a prudential matter, have a better chance of understanding the real political
context, which is only partially revealed by legislative history as argued to courts in litigation.").
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statutory text in a direction that enlarges the agency's own power, or that
invites the exercise of its policymaking discretion.53 An agency may act on a
faithful but myopic commitment to its own specialized mission, a
commitment that tends to discount, if not obscure, the legislative
compromises, tradeoffs, and rejected alternatives that would leave the agency
without the relevant policymaking discretion.54
Alternatively, an agency may use purposive interpretation to expand its
implementation powers through use of a strategically self-aggrandizing
"interpretive creep" that extends agency authority beyond what the enacting
legislature could possibly have meant.55 In either instance, it may be useful to
distinguish between a range of ethically defensible reasonable interpretations
and what the agency views as the optimal interpretive approach.56 Still,
whether through myopia or strategy, an agency profiting from its privileged
access may expand its policymaking discretion in ways deserving of judicial
pushback. And as Walker also recognizes, part of that pushback may well be
an argument to narrow the scope of Chevron deference.57
This debate about the benefits and risks associated with agencies' use of
purposive interpretation largely derives from agencies' role as participants in
the substantive lawmaking process, acting with OMB's knowledge and
acquiescence (if not always its full blessing). What do Walker's new findings
about technical drafting assistance add to this ongoing debate among
administrative law scholars and judges? Professor Walker, in effect, assumes
the agency officials' responses demonstrate that the risks of agency
manipulation are exacerbated, inasmuch as the agency is likely using technical
drafting assistance to create ambiguities that will subsequently expand its
power. Yet it may be equally plausible to view the technical drafting exchanges
as providing a purchase from which the agency can continue to understand
the congressional drafters' purpose and intent, even as the exchanges exert
virtually no influence over the substance of the legislative product.

53 See Walker, supra note 1, at 1411-12.
54 See Herz, supra note 50, at 104-05 ("The EPA may focus on Congress's desire to achieve
clean air in the Clean Air Act and do anything to get there, or the EEOC overemphasize equality
concerns and downplay employers' interests.").
55 See Damion M. Schiff, Purposivism and the "Reasonable Legislator": A Review Essay of Justice
Stephen Breyer's Active Liberty, 33 WML MITCHELL L. REV. 1981, 1091-92 (2007) (defining
interpretive creep as the movement of statutory interpretation toward a policy that was beyond what
was possible given the legislative makeup at the time of passage); Herz, supra note 5o, at 1o5-o6
(questioning if agencies are more prone to interpretive creep than judges).
56 See Aaron Saiger, Agencies' Obligation to Interpret the Statute, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1231, 1239-42
(2016) (exploring the difference between "ethics" and "internal normative direction" as applied to
agency statutory interpretation).
57 See Walker, supra note 1, at 1421-25.
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This latter perspective is especially relevant to the two types of process-related
motivations Walker identified: fostering a productive working relationship and
educating congressional staff. Insofar as technical drafting assistance is offered for
such non-merits reasons, it seems unlikely to affect the meaning or implications
of text. Rather, Walker's suggestions for narrowing the reach of Chevron
deference, or requiring that Congress be more precise about authorizing such
deference,s8 may depend on the assumption that an agency has helped shape
the ambiguities of particular texts through technical drafting assistance with
the primary purpose of avoiding disruption of the existing statutory or
regulatory scheme. But assuming, arguendo, that this motive for furnishing
technical drafting assistance is present at least some of the time, it remains to
be established that agencies in such settings are more than simply privileged
but peripherally involved observers in the development of those texts.
Walker argues cogently for his proposal that Chevron deference should be
more limited going forward-based on examining "whether the collective
Congress reasonably intended to delegate by ambiguity [a] particular issue to
the agency."59 In empirical terms, that argument should be evaluated
primarily by reviewing instances where agencies are acting with authorized
substantive input into the drafting process, as occurred in King v. Burwell.60
And there are several reasons to doubt whether the provision of technical
drafting assistance is likely to alter the calculus on this question.
First, Congress pursues multiple drafting channels as explained above,
and many do not implicate technical drafting assistance at all. In addition, it
seems intuitive to assume that when congressional staff request technical
drafting assistance, as opposed to asking for or receiving substantive
assistance, they are paying close attention to its being truly technical. This is
especially likely to be true if technical assistance is requested across the
partisan aisle. Even for same-party settings, members of Congress have paid
increasing institutional attention to the prospect of undue agency influence

58 See id. at 1421-22 ("[T]he Chevron Step Zero inquiry would focus not just on the formality
of the agency procedure creating the interpretation but also on whether the collective Congress
intended to delegate that particular substantive question to the agency.").
59 Id. at 1421.
60 In King v. Burwell, ChiefJustice Roberts for the Court recognized that "a statute's ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency [in this instance the IRS] to fill in
the statutory gaps," but declined to conclude that Congress intended such a delegation regarding
interpretation of the tax credit provisions of the Affordable Care Act-both because the provisions
were so centrally important to the statutory scheme and because the IRS lacked expertise on health
insurance policy matters. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015). Walker analogizes his case-by-case
approach for assessing delegation-by-ambiguity to the position taken by Chief Justice Roberts in
King v. Burwell. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1423-25.
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over the interpretation of the legislative work product.61 Further, Walker's
current findings do not appear to disclose how often technical drafting
assistance is generated for bills that pass, or how often within that subset the
motivation of agency officials was to avoid disruption of their existing
statutory scheme. At the very least, more precise information is required
given that the problem of injecting ambiguity should arise only if the agency
is actually a shaping player through its technical drafting assistance.
Finally, the possibility that this technical assistance creates meaningful
pressures to draft in broad, vague, or ambiguity-creating ways minimizes once
again the primary role of congressional staff. Committee staff may resist such
pressures, assuming technical drafting assistance produces them. Perhaps
more relevant, staff may favor textual ambiguity during the drafting process
primarily for legal process-type reasons 62 that do not advance the risk of
collusion with agencies as suggested by Walker.63 Such reasons include
avoiding excessively precise language in recognition that the law must cover
unforeseen circumstances of fact or social policy; maintaining a flexible
scheme under which regulated entities can survive or flourish even as they
are channeled in their service to public-seeking goals; enabling legislative
coalitions to form on the floor or in committee; and even failing to consider
the issue at all, given that legislative drafting and enactment may at times
take place in a "harried and hurried atmosphere."64 It is worth emphasizing
that these reasons are essentially unrelated to any agency drafting role, be it
substantive or technical.

61 See, e.g., Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 11 5 th Cong. §202 (2017) (requiring
courts to engage in de novo review of agency interpretations of statutes or regulations, thereby
overriding Chevron rule of deference, and passed by Republican controlled House on January i,
2017); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, H.R. 76, 115 th Cong. §2 (2017)(similarly aimed
legislation to modify the scope of judicial review, introduced by fifty-two Republican House
members); A bill to amend Section 706 to Title 5, United States Code, S.1766, 8th Cong. (1983)
9
(seeking the same result with a bipartisan group of seven Senators); Judicial Review Improvement
Act of 1985, S.12 5 6, 9 9 th Cong. (1985) (seeking the same result and introduced by a bipartisan group
of five Senators); cf Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3 d 1142, 1155 (loth Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (criticizing Chevron for having "added prodigious new powers to an already titanic
administrative state").
62 A corollary to the Hart & Sacks description of law as a purposive activity is that legislatures,
as legal institutions, act pursuant to a distinct set of processes and procedures-and that the
legislative process, which includes its own set of rules and standards, is informed, deliberative,
efficient, and public-seeking. See HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 695.
63 See Walker, supra note 1, at 1414-16 (explaining how the mutually helpful relationship
between agencies and Congress can lead to a structure where Congress as a body is no longer the
principal in the relationship).
64 Shine v. Shine, 802 F. 2d 583, 587 (1st Cir. 1986).
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CONCLUSION

Professor Walker has contributed intriguing findings to the conversation
regarding agency officials' involvement in the legislative drafting process. Still, the
inter-branch aspects of this process warrant further examination and analysis in a
larger, more diverse context. An important threshold question is whether
congressional staff regard the technical assistance they have requested and received
in the same consequential terms as the agency officials who provide it. I have tried
to explain why that may not be the case-given the absence of any uniform or
coordinated approach to congressional drafting; the important influence of divided
government on drafting dynamics; and the understandable inclination of legislative
outsiders to exaggerate the weight of their contributions to the drafting process.
Accepting, however, that technical drafting assistance plays some role in the
lawmaking enterprise, there remains the question whether the agency's added
technical purchase alters the pre-existing calculus regarding respect for agency
purposive interpretation. I am not sure why it should, unless one concludes that
this technical assistance is being successfully offered for strategic or self-promoting
reasons with non-trivial frequency, as Walker's interviewees seem to suggest. If that
is the case, then perhaps the current distinction should be framed not as technical
versus substantive drafting assistance but rather as agency-controlled versus
Congress-controlled drafting participation. Under this framing, Walker's
persuasive arguments against requiring presidential preclearance for technical
drafting assistance might also have implications for debates involving substantive
agency assistance in the drafting process. 6s
Finally, insofar as technical drafting assistance is delivered during periods when
ambiguities arise, or are allowed to remain, in the drafted text, I have suggested
that Congress has its own reasons for creating or preferring a certain amount of
ambiguity. Under such circumstances, technical drafting assistance may well make
no causal contribution. Accordingly, there would be no justification for altering the
deference regime in response to the agency's role.
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65 See Walker, supra note 1, at 1429-30 (contending that presidential review could (a) chill
dialogue between staffs and agency officials, (b) delay the quick turnaround time staff expect when
seeking such assistance, and (c) impose an unnecessary obstacle given that the agency's legislative
staff already serve as gatekeepers and liaisons with Congress).

